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A bank account is one of the most basic financial tools available,1 yet in the 
United States, one in eight people over the age of fifteen do not have one.2  
People without bank accounts are considered “unbanked.” 3   Many more 
Americans are considered “underbanked,” meaning they do have bank accounts, 
but they still use alternative financial service providers (such as prepaid cards, 
check cashers, and payday lenders) to meet their financial needs. 4   These 
alternative financial service providers are economically inefficient for 
consumers, but for people without meaningful access to bank accounts, they are 
a necessary substitute.5 
Various governmental and private enterprises have attempted to expand 
banking access to unbanked and underbanked people, but no systemic 
improvements have been made. 6   This Article suggests that a burgeoning 
technology—the mobile phone—is now sufficiently pervasive in American 
culture that it can be used to bring traditional bank accounts to those currently 
underserved.7 
Part I of this Article analyzes the unbanked and underbanked populations in 
the United States: who they are, why they are unbanked, and what the 
implications are of being so.  Part II describes the current state of mobile banking 
in America, and examines its potential to increase financial inclusion.  Part III 
discusses whether mobile banking for the poor can be commercially viable.  Part 
IV identifies features that should or could be incorporated into mobile banking 
products designed specifically for the unbanked. 
                                                 
 1. See Christopher Choe, Bringing in the Unbanked Off the Fringe: The Bank on San 
Francisco Model and the Need for Public and Private Partnership, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 
365, 365 (2009). 
 2. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014: FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION xviii, 171 tbl.B.1 (2014), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOBALFIN 
REPORT/Resources/8816096-1361888425203/9062080-1364927957721/GFDR-2014_Complete 
_Report.pdf (describing those without bank accounts as “unbanked”).  Other estimates are far 
higher.  See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 13031 n.17 (2004) 
(citing a 2002 U.S. Government Accountability Office study that estimates 28% of all Americans 
lack bank accounts). 
 3. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2, at 171 tbl.B.1.   
 4. See Barr, supra note 2, at 130 n.16. 
 5. See id. at 124, 13435. 
 6. See infra Part III.AB. 
 7. See Shanthi Elizabeth Senthe, Transformative Technology in Microfinance: Delivering 
Hope Electronically?, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L & POL’Y 1, 3 (2010) (“‘Telephones, mobile or 
landline, are facilitating devices that make possible effective action in many directions and 
function[] as amplifiers of human agency.’”) (quoting Max Leonard Schaub, Lines Across the 
Desert: Mobile Phone Use and Mobility in the Context of Trans-Saharan Migration, SOC. SCI. RES. 
NETWORK 3, Mar. 28, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723623). 
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I.  THE UNBANKED IN AMERICA 
About 10% of the adult population in the United States is unbanked, meaning 
they do not currently have a bank account.8  Two-thirds of these people have 
never had a bank account.9 
In addition to those who are unbanked, another 17% of American adults are 
underbanked, meaning they do have a bank account, but they utilize alternative 
financial service providers, such as check cashers, payday lenders, pawn shops, 
auto title lenders, or prepaid cards.10  Unbanked people either use alternative 
financial service providers or simply operate in cash.11  The FDIC estimates that 
29% of unbanked households are cash only.12 
In America, there are undeniable—and troubling—correlations between 
banking status and race, age, employment, and other characteristics. 13  
According to the FDIC, 20% of Black households and 18% of Hispanic 
households are unbanked, compared with just 3.6% of white households. 14  
Being unbanked also skews young: households where the householder is under 
the age of twenty-four are unbanked at a rate of 15.7%, and households headed 
by someone between twenty-five and thirty-four are unbanked at a rate of 
12.5%.15  Households experiencing unemployment are unbanked at a rate of 
23.0%, and households where the householder does not have a high school 
degree are unbanked at 25.1%.16  Immigration status also negatively correlates 
                                                 
 8. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMERS AND MOBILE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 2014, at 5 (Mar. 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ 
consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201403.pdf (finding that 10.5% of the adult 
population was unbanked in 2013).  Unsurprisingly, estimates vary.  See, e.g., FDIC, 2013 FDIC 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 15 (Oct. 2014) 
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013report.pdf (finding that 7.7% of households—not 
individuals—were unbanked in 2013); THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2, at 171 tbl.B.1 (finding 
that 12% of Americans over the age of fifteen are unbanked).  Whatever the exact figure, Americans 
are unbanked at a disgraceful rate when compared to other developed nations: fewer than 5% of 
Canadians, fewer than 3% of British residents, and fewer than 1% of Australians are unbanked.  Id. 
at 167, 171. 
 9. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 5 box 1.  
The fact that one third of unbanked people used to have bank accounts suggests that getting a bank 
account is not the same thing as keeping one. 
 10. Id. 
 11. FDIC, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC INCLUSION POTENTIAL OF MOBILE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 6 box 1 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/community/mobile/Mobile-Financial-
Services.pdf. 
 12. Id.  The FDIC is statutorily required to conduct a bi-annual survey on efforts being made 
to bring the unbanked into the formal banking system.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1831z(a)(1) (2012). 
 13. See FDIC, supra note 8, at 5.  Immigration status is implicated as well.  See Barr, supra 
note 2, at 131–32 (noting that immigrants may face linguistic barriers that compound other barriers 
to becoming banked). 
 14. FDIC, supra note 8, at 16 tbl.A-1a. 
 15. Id. at 17 tbl.A-1a. 
 16. Id. 
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with being unbanked, as foreign-born non-citizens living in the United States are 
unbanked at a rate of 22.7%, compared to 6.9% of U.S. born citizens and 4.7% 
of foreign-born citizens.17 
Even more significant than race, age, immigration, or employment status, 
however, is income level.  Households earning less than $15,000 per year are 
unbanked at a rate of 27.2%, and households earning between $15,000 and 
$30,000 per year are unbanked at a rate of 11.4%. 18   Overall, unbanked 
Americans are disproportionately nonwhite, young, and poor.19 
A.  Why People Are Unbanked 
When the unbanked are asked why they do not have a bank account, the most 
common answer is that they do not have enough money to warrant an account.20  
Many unbanked people, further, cite high or unpredictable account fees as a 
reason for not having a bank account. 21   These individuals, mostly poor, 
typically transact relatively small amounts of money, and they find (or fear) that 
minimum balance requirements, overdraft fees, and other bank account features 
are more expensive than the value of the account.22  In short, most unbanked 
Americans feel a bank account costs more than it is worth.23 
Some unbanked people had bank accounts previously, indicating that account 
retention, as well as account acquisition, is a problem.  The Federal Reserve 
found in 2013 that 34% of the then-unbanked population previously had a bank 
account.24  The most common reasons for discontinuing bank account use are 
the same as those of people who have never had bank accounts: customers do 
not have enough money to warrant the account, account fees are too high or 
unpredictable, or the customers do not like dealing with or do not trust banks.25 
These previously banked individuals may have discontinued their accounts 
for their own reasons or had their accounts terminated for misuse of the 
account. 26   Misuse of a bank account, unfortunately, can have long-term 
                                                 
 17. Id.  There are complex issues at play in the intersection of banking and immigration status, 
see, e.g., id. at 28, but discussion of immigration-specific issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 18. Id. at 17 tbl.A-1a. 
 19. Id. at 1617 tbl.A-1a. 
 20. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 5 fig.A 
(noting that 25% of survey respondents identified lack of funds as the most important reason for 
not having an account); FDIC, supra note 8, at 24 (57.5% of households “did not feel they had 
enough money to keep in an account or to meet a minimum balance requirement[,]” and 35.6% 
cited lack of money as the main reason they were unbanked). 
 21. FDIC, supra note 8, at 24 (30.8% of unbanked households cite this as a reason for being 
unbanked, while 13.4% cite it as the main reason). 
 22. See Choe, supra note 1, at 367. 
 23. See Barr, supra note 2, at 13132. 
 24. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 5 box 1. 
 25. FDIC, supra note 8, at 25 figs.3.6 & 3.7. 
 26. See Peggy Delinois Hamilton, Why the Check Cashers Win: Regulatory Barriers to 
Banking the Unbanked, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 119, 12324 (2007). 
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ramifications.  Most banks rely on ChexSystems, a consumer reporting 
“software that records consumers with poor banking practices”27 or who have 
engaged in “account mishandling.”28  ChexSystems retains information for five 
years, and subsequent banks use this information in their screening process, 
allowing them to refuse an account to flagged individuals.29  While this system 
presumably keeps “high-risk or fraudulent consumers” out of the banking 
system, it also punishes those who made innocent mistakes.30 
Another common reason for being unbanked is a general distrust or dislike of 
banks.  In its biennial survey of unbanked and underbanked Americans, the 
FDIC found that 34.2% of unbanked respondents cited this as a reason for being 
unbanked, and 14.9% cited it as the primary reason.31  Many individuals who 
previously had bank accounts reported that they “‘[got] in trouble,’ that is, over-
drafting an account and failing—or in some cases refusing—to pay the requisite 
penalties.”32  These experiences left some people “with strong, negative feelings 
towards financial institutions.”33 
The other side of the don’t-like-banks coin is that some people feel that 
alternative financial service locations provide better service. 34   While the 
unbanked are driven into using alternative financial services for their 
transactional needs,35 underbanked people voluntarily use alternative financial 
services.36  This is largely due to increased convenience.37  Alternative financial 
service providers are often open longer hours than bank branches and deliver 
cash or credit on the spot.38  Alternative financial service providers also typically 
charge up-front fees, whereas unbanked people often perceive bank accounts as 
having “penalties and hidden costs.”39 
Banks, for their part, believe there is little financial incentive to offer 
traditional banking products specifically to the unbanked.  Because unbanked 
                                                 
 27. Id. at 123. 
 28. See Choe, supra note 1, at 367 n.12. 
 29. See Barr, supra note 2, at 181. 
 30. See Hamilton, supra note 26, at 123. 
 31. FDIC, supra note 8, at 24. 
 32. Rourke O’Brien, “We Don’t Do Banks”: Financial Lives of Families on Public 
Assistance, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 485, 488 (2012). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 16869 
(2014). 
 35. See Choe, supra note 1, at 36566. 
 36. See FDIC, supra note 8, at 4; Barr, supra note 2, at 124 (noting that the underbanked may 
rely on alternative financial services despite having traditional bank accounts). 
 37. FDIC, supra note 8, at 63 (noting the convenience of “[m]obile technology,” which 
“provides consumers with the ability to conveniently conduct transactions and view account 
balances anytime and anywhere”). 
 38. See Choe, supra note 1, at 373. 
 39. Id. at 375, 382. 
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individuals make such small transactions and carry small balances, banks do not 
expect significant profit from these customers.40 
B.  What it Means to be Unbanked 
Bank accounts serve several important, if basic, purposes: they offer an 
opportunity to deposit and save money, access to a secure and inexpensive 
payment system, physical security, access to credit, and the convenience of 
locating all these services under one roof at lower costs.41  In short, banks 
provide financial and physical security. 42   Alternative financial service 
providers, on the other hand, offer these services at significant expense or do not 
offer them at all.43 
1.  Savings and Deposits 
Bank accounts facilitate savings because they are a place to deposit and store 
funds that are not being spent.44  Savings, in turn, allow individuals to “buy 
homes, pay for education, or start small businesses; all of which are proven 
measures to develop assets and accumulate wealth.”45 
Some deposited funds, typically those in savings accounts, accrue interest.46  
All funds deposited with regulated state and federal banks are, within statutory 
limitations, insured by the FDIC.47  Check-cashers, in contrast, do not offer a 
place to keep funds on deposit, and offer no interest or insurance.48  While 
prepaid cards offer a place to keep funds on deposit, they typically do not offer 
                                                 
 40. See Baradaran, supra note 34, at 168; Choe, supra note 1, at 367. 
 41. FDIC, supra note 8, at 13. 
 42. See id.; Barr, supra note 2, at 134.  Banks also offer 
various federal consumer protections that are guaranteed by law, ensured by supervision, 
and enforced through ongoing examination.  These include disclosures, requirements 
related to terms and conditions of product offerings, and protection from unfair or 
deceptive practices and discrimination.  In addition, participation in mainstream financial 
markets improves a consumer’s ability to access a range of financial products and 
services, develop wealth, build a credit history, and access credit products. 
FDIC, supra note 11, at 5. 
 43. See Choe, supra note 1, at 366 (“For example, a person earning $20,000 per year after 
taxes might pay a total of approximately $400 per year in check-cashing fees.”). 
 44. See Hamilton, supra note 26, at 124. 
 45. Id. at 126. 
 46. See id. at 124.  Large depositors can offset any bank account fees with the interest they 
accrue.  See Julie Andersen Hill, Transaction Account Fees: Do the Poor Really Pay More than 
the Rich?, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 65, 92 (2012) (recounting how banks attempted to provide other 
services and free products to large depositors where interest did not offset fees). 
 47. See Deposit Insurance, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 48. See Hamilton, supra note 26 at 12627 (noting that alternative financial institutions offer 
limited opportunities to save money and are not as strictly regulated as banks). 
2015] Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in America? 227 
interest,49 and they are not insured in the same manner as bank accounts.50  
Bluebird, for instance, offers “pass-through” FDIC insurance, meaning that 
Bluebird’s parent company, American Express, places Bluebird-deposited funds 
at FDIC-insured banks.51  If those banks fail, the FDIC will insure them, but if 
American Express fails, the funds may not be insured.52 
2.  Payment Systems 
Bank accounts, especially transaction accounts, typically allow customers to 
direct a transaction from their own account to the account of another either by 
check, debit, or electronic transfer.53  Most of these services are free—banks 
typically do not charge a fee for writing a check54—and the merchant rather than 
the bank customer typically pays debit fees.55  Alternative financial service 
providers, on the other hand, charge significant fees to deliver payments to utility 
companies, for example, or to issue money orders.56 
Bank transfers can also be arranged and conducted promptly.  Checks can be 
written on the spot and handed over, debit transactions take place almost as 
quickly as a PIN can be entered, and electronic transfers can be arranged at any 
time of day on a bank’s website or through a mobile application.57  Customers 
of alternative financial service providers are not so lucky; they must go to the 
                                                 
 49. See, e.g., BLUEBIRD BY AMERICAN EXPRESS & WALMART, www.bluebird.com (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2016); see also Terms of Use, BLUEBIRD, www.bluebird.com/legal (last visited Jan. 
2, 2016). 
 50. See, e.g., Get a Bluebird Account, BLUEBIRD, www.bluebird.com/faqs (last visited Jan. 
2, 2016). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 43 (5th ed. 
2013) (“A transaction account is any account from which a customer may withdraw money by 
check, electronic transfer, or similar means for payment to others.”).  For most people, this means 
a checking account.  While the two are not technically the same (a checking account is one kind of 
transaction account), the difference is not material for the purposes of this Article. 
 54. See Hill, supra note 46, at 80.  Payment processing, from the bank’s perspective, is one 
of the most expensive aspects of transaction accounts.  See id.  Even on “free” checking accounts, 
though, a bank makes money by charging fees, such as those on overdrafts, charging interest on 
loans of deposited funds, and cross-selling other banking services.  See id. at 8182, 101. 
 55. See id. at 83.  Such “interchange fees” are restricted by regulations promulgated pursuant 
to the Durbin Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.  See id. 
 56. See Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 492 
(2013). 
 57. See generally SPENT: LOOKING FOR CHANGE (American Express Travel Related Services 
Company, Inc. 2014) (exploring issues faced by the underbanked in the United States and 
highlighting a number of the discrepancies between mainstream banking services and alternative 
financial service providers). 
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center’s physical location58  and stand in line before they can conduct their 
business.59 
Cashing paper checks, whether at a bank or at an alternative financial service 
provider, is economically inefficient when compared to electronic transactions; 
debit and electronic payments can be processed far more cheaply.60  By one 
estimate, every paper check that is replaced by an electronic transfer saves one 
dollar.61  By shifting payments from paper checks to electronic transfers, the cost 
savings and increased efficiency are significant. 
3.  Security 
When funds are on deposit at a bank, they are far safer than when stored at 
home or in a pocket.  Not only does the FDIC insure most deposited funds,62 but 
the physical cash is also safer from theft, fire, or natural disaster, simply because 
the bank building has better security.63  Patrons of check-cashing stores, on the 
other hand, are at significant risk of robbery or mugging; it is likely that people 
walking out of a check-casher have a large amount of cash on their persons,64 
and customers frequently cash paychecks at regular, predictable intervals, 
increasing their risk of theft.65 
                                                 
 58. See id. at 27:20 (“I got a job in Dallas.  While I was there, one of my payments was due.  
So I called up.  They were like, ‘We can[not] take a payment over the phone.  You have to come 
in.’  I said, ‘Well, can I go to one of your sister companies?’  ‘No, you have to come to this store.’”). 
 59. See, e.g., Edward C. Baig, AMEX at SXSW: Trying To Go from Exclusive to Inclusive, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2014, 5:41 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/baig/ 
2014/03/13/americanexpress-sxsw-going-from-exclusive-to-inclusive/6382699/ (discussing a 
hypothetical “all-too-common scenario in which someone stands in line for [forty-five] minutes to 
get a check cashed”). 
 60. See Hill, supra note 46, at 80. 
 61. See Barr, supra note 2, at 141 (citing Deborah Matthews, Financial Institutions 
Partnering with Corporations: Innovative Strategies for Promoting Direct Deposit, in NACHA, 
EBT IN THE STATES: SURVEY RESULTS, 2002 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS REVIEW AND BUYER’S 
GUIDE 46 (2002)). 
 62.  See Understanding Deposit Insurance, FDIC, www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2016) (“The standard insurance amount is $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, 
for each account ownership category [e.g., checking, savings, money market deposit, and 
certificates of deposit].”). 
 63. See Choe, supra note 1, at 382.  Well-meaning people may even remove cash accidentally.  
See, e.g., Bill Chappell, After Finding $40,000 in Thrift-Store Couch, Roommates Return Money, 
NPR (May 16, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/05/16/313118337/ 
thrift-store-couch-yields-40-000-roommates-return-money (telling the story of a family who 
upgraded a woman’s sofa, giving the old one to the thrift store without realizing it was stuffed with 
her life savings). 
 64. See Barr, supra note 2, at 134; Choe, supra note 1, at 382. 
 65. See Barr, supra note 2, at 134; Choe, supra note 1, at 382. 
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4.  Access to Credit 
For individuals with bank accounts, banks and other regulated financial 
institutions are often the first stop for reliable, affordable credit. 66   Home 
mortgages and auto loans are available at reasonable interest rates,67 and credit 
cards provide shorter-term credit for other purchases.68   The unbanked and 
underbanked, however, must often rely on fringe banking institutions such as 
payday lenders, auto title loan companies, and pawnshops for credit: 
These lenders are often usurious, sometimes predatory, and almost 
always much worse for low-income individuals than the services 
offered by traditional banks to their customers.  For instance, the 
average annual income for an unbanked family is $25,500, and about 
10% of that income, or $2412, goes to the fees and interest paid to 
access credit or other financial services—services that those with bank 
accounts often get for free.69 
As with deposits and payment systems, those most in need of credit and least 
able to pay for it are charged more dearly.70 
Because fringe banks do not report loans to credit bureaus, utilizing these 
services also hinders an individual’s ability to establish his or her own 
creditworthiness. 71   Instead, payday and car title loan customers are often 
ensnared in a vicious cycle of rolling over their loans time and again, accruing 
crippling additional fees.72 
5.  Convenience and Lower Cost 
Banks and regulated financial institutions offer numerous services and 
products, both on their own and through affiliated institutions.  They offer 
multiple access points, with ATMs and expanding Internet and mobile banking 
services that complement personal interaction at physical branch locations.73  
They also offer basic financial services for low or no cost.  For example, banks 
do not charge fees to deposit funds.74  When a paycheck is deposited, the bank 
customer is entitled to the face amount of the check.75 
The unbanked and underbanked, on the other hand, spend considerable 
amounts of time and effort conducting simple transactions, driving to and from 
                                                 
 66. See Choe, supra note 1, at 382. 
 67. See MICHAEL S. BARR, NO SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW INCOME AMERICANS 
7 (2012). 
 68. See Barr, supra note 2, at 13940. 
 69. Baradaran, supra note 34, at 167. 
 70. See Barr, supra note 2, at 13839. 
 71. See Choe, supra note 1, at 382. 
 72. See id. at 377. 
 73. See Barr, supra note 2, at 21013. 
 74. See Choe, supra note 1, at 381. 
 75. See id. at 36970. 
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alternative financial service providers, waiting in line, and delivering payments 
to vendors and creditors.76  Check-cashers charge significant fees to cash a 
check, and do not offer a place to keep those funds on deposit.77   These check-
cashing fees are imposed despite the fact that the vast majority of these checks 
are paychecks and government benefit payments, which carry an extremely low 
risk of being returned for having insufficient funds.78  As one observer wrote, 
“There is absolutely no good reason why a person earning $20,000 per year 
should spend $240 a year to access their own hard-earned money.  This, 
however, is what millions of Americans are doing.”79 
Individuals who use check-cashers are effectively paying a fee to access their 
own money, a fee that banks do not impose.  Because the poor are more likely 
to use check-cashers, while the middle- and upper-class are more likely to use 
banks, these fees are being paid by those least able to afford them.80 
II.  MOBILE BANKING AS (PART OF) THE SOLUTION 
Various efforts have been made over the years to bring the unbanked into the 
banking system.  Some have been public programs, such as Treasury’s First 
Accounts Program,81 while others were private or non-profit driven, like Bank 
on San Francisco and similar programs.82  While most individual programs are 
considered “successful,” the continuing high percentage of unbanked Americans 
demonstrates that there has been no systemic improvement.83 
Most of these banking programs consisted of big pushes to market existing 
products to new customers, rather than developing innovative programs or 
technologies.84  The First Accounts Program, for example, went as far as to tout 
                                                 
 76. See generally, SPENT: LOOKING FOR CHANGE, supra note 57. 
 77. See Barr, supra note 2, at 134.  One study found that people earning $12,000 per year pay 
an annual average of $250 simply to cash their paychecks at check-cashers.  Id. 
 78. See id. at 13435. 
Almost all of the checks cashed at check cashers pose relatively low risk: Payroll 
payments . . . constitute 80% of checks cashed at these check cashing outlets.  Another 
16% are government benefit checks, which again pose low risk.  A large portion of these 
checks could presumably be directly deposited into bank accounts at relatively low 
cost—if low-income people had bank accounts. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 79. Choe, supra note 1, at 37677. 
 80. See id. at 366; see also Barr, supra note 2, at 13441. 
 81. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST ACCOUNTS 
PROGRAM (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financial-education/Documents/ 
ExecutiveSummary_FirstAccounts_1-9-09.pdf.  More than 37,000 new accounts were opened in 
an approximately two-year period.  Id. at iii. 
 82. See Choe, supra note 1, at 38488. 
 83. See supra notes 1017 and accompanying text. 
 84. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 81, at xi (discussing the First Accounts 
Program’s tactics for getting the unbanked to set up bank accounts).  The analysis found that “[t]he 
majority of [First Accounts Program] respondents had held accounts before participating in First 
Accounts, but for various reasons they had become unbanked.”  Id. at x. 
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that most banks were not required to develop new banking products for the 
targeted new customers.85 
Rather than attempt to increase financial inclusion by simply encouraging the 
unbanked to open existing types of bank accounts, new technology—mobile 
phones—has the potential to change the relationship between customers and 
their bank accounts.  This different, more useful, and more efficient relationship 
may serve to incentivize the unbanked to enter the banking system. 
Mobile phones are becoming increasingly ubiquitous in the United States.  As 
of January 2014, 90% of all adults have a cell phone, and as of October 2014, 
64% have a smartphone.86  Given this level of penetration, mobile banking87 
may serve as a transformative technology that brings the unbanked and 
underbanked more fully into the banking system.88 
A.  Mobile Banking Among the Fully Banked and Underbanked 
Many banks currently have mobile applications that allow users to access their 
bank accounts digitally, though mobile banking’s popularity is still nascent.89  
Nearly one quarter of banked households use mobile banking apps to access their 
accounts, in addition to using other access methods such as tellers, ATMs, and 
online banking.90  Among those who use mobile banking, about a quarter use it 
as their primary banking method.91  Most mobile banking activity consists of 
                                                 
 85. See id. at xi.  While the First Accounts program resulted in the opening of more than 
37,000 new accounts, information is scarce on how many of those accounts have remained in use 
over time.  See id. at ix. 
 86. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, http://www. 
pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).  Smartphone 
ownership is growing rapidly.  See Device Ownership Over Time, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET 
PROJECT, http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/device-ownership/ (last visited Jan. 2, 
2016). 
 87. Some literature makes a distinction between mobile banking (conducting account 
inquiries and transactions between a customer and a bank) and mobile payments (transferring 
money in exchange for goods and services, which may be conducted by a bank or other mobile 
payment system).  See, e.g., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra 
note 8, at 4.  The distinction is not especially relevant for this Article, so these activities will be 
referred to collectively as “mobile banking.” 
 88. See DAVID PORTEOUS, DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR 
MOBILE BANKING IN AFRICA 15 (2006) (discussing the difference between additive and 
transformative approaches); see also Senthe, supra note 7, at 89 (“Most mobile banking 
applications are additive in that they provide a new delivery channel to existing bank customers.  
Transformative models integrate unbanked populations into the formal financial sector.”) (quoting 
Janine Firpo, EMoney—Mobile Money—Mobile Banking—What’s the Difference?, WORLD BANK 
PRIV. SECTOR DEV. BLOG (Jan. 21, 2009), http://blogs.worldbank.org.psd/e-money-mobile-
money-mobile-banking-what-s-the-difference). 
 89. FDIC, supra note 8, at 50.  Bank tellers remain the most popular method used to access 
bank accounts.  See id. at 54 fig.8.2. 
 90. See id. at 55. 
 91. See id. at 5960. 
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checking account balances and transaction history.92  “Only a quarter (25.5%) 
of households that use[] mobile banking deposited a check via mobile.”93 
Mobile banking use is higher among owners of smartphones than owners of 
feature phones.94  Whereas 33% of all mobile phone users have used online 
banking, 51% of smartphone users use mobile banking.95  This is presumably 
because the interactive screen and Internet connectivity of a smartphone increase 
the ease and utility of mobile banking; the visuals of an app may also be more 
conducive to conducting business than dialing into or texting with a bank’s 
automated response system.96  As smartphones become more ubiquitous, mobile 
banking is likely to become more accepted and commonplace.97 
Mobile banking—and smartphone ownership—is “highly correlated with 
age.”98  Thirty-nine percent of mobile banking users are between eighteen and 
twenty-nine years old, with another 34% of mobile banking users between thirty 
and forty-four.99  This means that 73% of all mobile banking users have not yet 
celebrated their forty-fifth birthdays. 
Interestingly, underbanked individuals tend to be heavier users of mobile 
banking technology than fully banked individuals.100  Underbanked households 
are also more likely than banked households to have access to a mobile phone 
or smartphone.101  According to research by the Federal Reserve, “Among the 
underbanked, 88% have a mobile phone, 64% of which are smartphones.  The 
underbanked population makes substantial use of mobile banking.  Almost 39% 
of the underbanked with mobile phones report using mobile banking in the past 
12 months, while 22 percent report using mobile payments.”102  This suggests 
that the underbanked are already poised for greater financial inclusion by means 
of mobile banking. 
                                                 
 92. See id. at 60 (noting that 86% of mobile banking users “monitor bank account balances 
and recent transactions”); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 
8, at 10 fig.3 (noting that 99% of mobile users check account balances and transactional inquiries). 
 93. FDIC, supra note 7, at 60. 
 94. See id. at 59 (finding that 23.2% of all banked households used mobile banking in the past 
twelve months compared to 36.2% of households with smartphones).  Feature phones are mobile 
phones that generally have greater capabilities than standard mobile phones, but “lack advanced 
connectivity options and a robust operating system [necessary] for third-party application 
development.”  Kevin Khachatryan, Medical Device Regulation in the Information Age: A Mobile 
Health Perspective, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 477, 479 n.11 (2015). 
 95. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 7. 
 96. See FDIC, supra note 11, at 21. 
 97. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 1011 
(suggesting that “the convenience of mobile banking has overtaken smartphone adoption as the 
driving force behind mobile banking adoption”). 
 98. Id. at 9. 
 99. See id. 
 100. FDIC, supra note 8, at 59. 
 101. See id. at 50 tbl.7.1 (noting that 90.5% of unbanked households have mobile phones, and 
64.5% have smartphones, compared to 86.8% and 59.0% of banked households, respectively). 
 102. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 5 box 1. 
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B.  Mobile Banking Potential for the Unbanked 
Mobile banking, as it is currently set up in the United States, is generally a 
new portal into an existing bank account.103  Because unbanked individuals do 
not have access to bank accounts to begin with, however, current mobile banking 
platforms are not capable of meaningfully increasing financial inclusion among 
the unbanked.  Because the unbanked are disproportionately young, poor, and 
nonwhite, America verges on having two financial systems: a regulated, 
affordable, centralized system for the haves, and a patchwork, more expensive, 
less regulated system for the have-nots.104 
Several demographic characteristics suggest, however, that with some 
modifications and improvements to current mobile banking practices,105  the 
unbanked are precisely the population that can be reached by mobile phone 
technology.106  Rather than create a separate, workaround financial system for 
the unbanked, mobile technology may be able to bring the unbanked into the 
traditional banking system. 
1.  Demographics 
Mobile phone users, like the unbanked, are typically young, and data suggest 
that racial minorities are more likely than whites to use mobile phones and adopt 
mobile banking practices.107  The unbanked are also disproportionately poor, 
and while mobile phone ownership does not positively correlate with low 
income, such low incomes may not necessarily constitute a hindrance to mobile 
banking adoption.108 
Unsurprisingly, the unbanked are less likely than those with bank accounts to 
have mobile phones.109  Access to mobile phones, like access to bank accounts, 
increases with income.110  However, among people who own mobile phones, 
there appears to be no correlation with income level and use of mobile banking; 
that is, poorer people with mobile phones are just as likely to use mobile banking 
as wealthier people with mobile phones.111 
Mobile phone ownership skews young.  Among individuals under the age of 
fifty-five, more than 86% have access to a mobile phone.112  Among those aged 
                                                 
 103. Although a small number of banks currently allow accounts to be opened via a mobile 
phone, this capability is not widely available.  See FDIC, supra note 11, at 17. 
 104. See supra notes 1319 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra Part IV for suggestions and recommendations. 
 106. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 21. 
 107. See id. at 13. 
 108. See id. at 21; see also FDIC, supra note 11, at 6 box 1. 
 109. FDIC, supra note 8, at 50 tbl.7.1. 
 110. See id. (“For example, about 70 percent . . . of households with income below $30,000 
had access to a mobile phone, compared to 91.6 percent of households with income of at least 
$75,000.”). 
 111. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 10. 
 112. FDIC, supra note 8, at 50. 
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forty-five to fifty-four, 62.8% have access to a smartphone.113  Among those 
younger than forty-five, smartphone ownership jumps to over 72%.114  This is 
an exciting overlap because young people, who are most likely to have a mobile 
phone, are also among those most likely to be unbanked.115  Indeed, although 
the unbanked are less likely than the underbanked or fully banked to have mobile 
phones, significant numbers of the unbanked do have mobile phones.  According 
to the FDIC’s research, 68.1% of unbanked households have access to a mobile 
phone, and 33.1% have access to a smartphone.116  Even among households that 
have never been banked, 61.1% have access to a mobile phone, and 26.0% have 
access to a smartphone.117  The Federal Reserve’s research shows even higher 
rates of mobile phone ownership among the unbanked: “Among individuals who 
are unbanked, 69 percent have access to a mobile phone and 49 percent of these 
are smartphones.”118 
Another promising correlation is that racial minorities, who are more likely to 
be unbanked, are also more likely to adopt mobile banking than whites.119  For 
example, while 14% of all mobile phone users are Hispanic, Hispanics conduct 
19% of all mobile banking transactions.120  This suggests that if new minority 
customers can be brought into the banking system, they will adopt and use 
mobile banking and increase their financial inclusion.  Importantly, surveyed 
unbanked people expressed a willingness to use mobile banking technology: “19 
percent [of] unbanked households with mobile phones reported being likely to 
use mobile banking in the next 12 months[,] compared to 9 percent of fully 
banked households.”121 
In addition, “45 percent of adults with incomes below $30,000 use mostly 
their phone to access the Internet compared to about a third (34 percent) of all 
adults.”122  This statistic suggests that for many poor people, online banking—
banking from a laptop or desktop computer—is not a feasible method of 
accessing the banking system.  On the other hand, it also means that a large 
portion of the less affluent already utilize mobile phone technology for Internet 
access. 
                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 116. FDIC, supra note 8, at 50. 
 117. Id. (finding that “[a]mong individuals who are unbanked, 69 percent have access to a 
mobile phone and 49 percent of these are smartphones”). 
 118. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 5 box 
1.  International experiences, such as those with WIZZIT, demonstrate that feature phones are 
capable of providing basic services for banking customers.  See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 119. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 10. 
 120. See id. 
 121. FDIC, supra note 11, at 16. 
 122. Id. at 11 (citing MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., Cell Internet 
Use 2013 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/16/cell-internet-use-2013/). 
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2.  Utility 
The underbanked in America are already poised for greater financial inclusion 
through mobile banking.123  They are more likely to have smartphones and more 
likely than even fully banked households to use mobile banking as their primary 
banking channel.124  The question remains, however, whether mobile banking 
can increase financial inclusion among the unbanked—those who do not have 
bank accounts already. 
Recalling that many unbanked people do not have an account generally 
because the costs exceed the value,125 mobile banking may provide sufficiently 
increased convenience to induce many unbanked individuals to seek bank 
accounts.  Even ignoring the possibility that lower-cost accounts may be 
feasible,126 the convenience of having bank access in one’s pocket may increase 
the value of the account to the point that it exceeds the costs.127 
Recall also that many unbanked and underbanked individuals use alternative 
financial services because their hours and locations are more convenient than 
bank branches or tellers.128  Mobile banking is even more accessible because it 
is available any time from the palm of one’s hand.129  Moreover, mobile banking 
“provides consumers the ability to act on [account] information conveniently to 
conduct timely financial transactions that can help them avoid problems such as 
overdrafts, fraud, and late fees.”130   Moreover, the account holder’s mobile 
phone would also provide access to an insured account at a regulated bank, 
providing “security and storage capability, thus removing the need to store 
physical cash under the mattress or conceal it on the person.”131 
Importantly, mobile banking meets the customer where she is. Traditional 
bank accounts require the customer to go to a branch, ATM, or web browser, 
while mobile banking is in her pocket.132  In this way, mobile phone technology 
has dramatically increased financial inclusion in other countries, and may be 
                                                 
 123. See supra notes 94102 and accompanying text. 
 124. FDIC, supra note 8, at 63. 
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
 126. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 127. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 128. See supra notes 3639 and accompanying text. 
 129. FDIC, supra note 11, at 11. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Senthe, supra note 7, at 7. 
 132. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see generally GAUTAM IVATURY & MARK 
PICKENS, THE WORLD BANK CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR, Mobile Phone Banking 
and Low-Income Customers: Evidence from South Africa (2006), https://www.cgap.org/sites/ 
default/files/CGAP-Mobile-Phone-Banking-and-Low-Income-Customers-Evidence-from-South-
Africa-Jan-2006.pdf. 
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able to do so in the United States as well.133  Two examples from Africa provide 
interesting information for American banking.134 
a.  WIZZIT 
In South Africa, a country with a population of fifty-two million,135 only 
53.6% of individuals age fifteen and over have bank accounts.136  However, “the 
mobile phone penetration rate in South Africa [is] almost 100 percent, thanks in 
large part to the onset of prepaid services that offer low-cost handsets and the 
opportunity to buy airtime in advance.”137 
In December 2004, a company called WIZZIT entered the market with the 
soaring mission “[t]o change the world by providing banking opportunities 
[globally] to the 4 billion unbanked and under-banked through cell phone 
technology, leading to a reduction of poverty and the creation of economic 
citizens.”138  Despite these global aspirations, WIZZIT so far remains confined 
to South Africa.139 
WIZZIT customers can open bank accounts via their mobile phones by calling 
in to the company and entering their national identification numbers,140 or by a 
face-to-face meeting with the company’s commissioned employees, called 
“whizz kids.”141  WIZZIT itself does not have a banking license; instead, it 
partners with or, depending on the source, “piggybacks on” the licensed South 
African Bank of Athens.142 
WIZZIT does not have its own branches or ATMs.143  Deposits can be made 
in person at the branches of partner Absa Bank or at South African post office 
locations, and electronic deposits can be made by a direct transfer into a WIZZIT 
                                                 
 133. See supra Part II.B.; see also IVATURY & PICKENS, supra note 132, at 89. 
 134. See infra Part II.B.2.ab 
 135. See The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact 
book/geos/sf.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 136. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2, at 171 app.b, tbl.B.1. 
 137. Carmen Nobel, Mobile Banking for the Unbanked, WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Jun. 13, 
2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6729.html. 
 138. Vision, WIZZIT, www.wizzit.co.za/?q=node/65 (last visited Jan. 2, 2016); see also 
IVATURY & PICKENS, supra note 132, at 2. 
 139. History, WIZZIT, http://www.wizzit.co.za/?q=node/197 (last visited Jan. 2, 2016) 
(stating that WIZZIT is actively looking to expand and has established partnership initiatives in 
Eastern Europe and other African countries). 
 140. See IVATURY & PICKENS, supra note 132, at 3. 
 141. Vivienne A. Lawack, Mobile Money, Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity: The 
South African Case, 8 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 317, 320 n.7 (2013). 
 142. Maya Fisher-French, Talking ‘Bout a Revolution, MAVERICK MAG. (Nov. 3, 2005), http:// 
www.journalism.co.za/wp-content/uploads/fisher_final_final.pdf; See Nobel, supra note 137. 
 143. See IVATURY & PICKENS, supra note 132, at 2. 
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account. 144   Cash may be withdrawn at any South African ATM, using a 
WIZZIT-affiliated debit card,145 and peer-to-peer funds transfers can be effected 
from the customers’ mobile phones.146  Funds transfers can be made in exchange 
for goods and services or to send money to friends and family. 147   Daily 
transaction limits are placed on each account; the maximum daily transaction 
limit is R25,000 (approximately $1,600).148 
WIZZIT focuses on keeping user fees and costs low.  The sign-up fee is 
R99.99 (approximately $6.40), which includes the account-opening fee and the 
cost of the debit card.149  Initially, WIZZIT did not charge a monthly fee and did 
not have a minimum balance, but now it does.150  The monthly fee is R19.98 
(approximately $1.30), which covers the internet banking services, bank 
statements, and, oddly, a R5,000 (approxiamtely $320) funeral insurance policy 
with partner company Sanlam.151  The minimum monthly balance is also quite 
low, at R30.00 (approximately $1.90).152  WIZZIT users pay a flat fee for each 
payment made from their account: WIZZIT-to-WIZZIT transactions cost the 
sender R3.99 (approximately $0.25), and WIZZIT-to-non-WIZZIT transactions 
cost the sender R5.99 (approximately $0.40). 153   WIZZIT accounts with 
balances over R10,000 (approximately $640) earn 1% interest.154 
Technically, WIZZIT customers can open and utilize accounts even if they do 
not have mobile phones, but the service is far more convenient and effective 
with phone access.155  It is possible, however, for multiple people to share one 
mobile phone in order to access different WIZZIT accounts, provided each 
WIZZIT customer has her own SIM card.156  WIZZIT works on older-model 
                                                 
 144. Frequently Asked Questions, WIZZIT, http://www.wizzit.co.za/?q=node/76 (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2016).  Deposits made at post offices are reflected in account balances in as little as forty-
eight hours.  See id. 
 145. See Abbey Stermler & Anjanette H. Raymond, Promoting Investment in Agricultural 
Production: Increasing Legal Tools for Small to Medium Farmers, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. LJ. 281, 313 (2013); IVATURY & PICKENS, supra note 132, at 2. 
 146. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 144. 
 147. See IVATURY & PICKENS, supra note 132, at 2. 
 148. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 144.  As of February 24, 2016, the South 
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mobile phones and is not limited to a single telecommunications network.157  
Customer service is provided online or by calling a customer support center.158 
Customers like WIZZIT because they feel it is inexpensive, secure, 
convenient, and fast.159  WIZZIT customers are generally low-income, but they 
“tend to have higher income and assets than nonusers and also greater financial 
and technological sophistication.”160  While “customers must still visit bank 
branches for cash deposits,” they can save valuable time by “us[ing] their mobile 
phones to check their account balance, make payments, or transfer money to 
friends and family.”161 
A 2011 Harvard Business School case study on mobile banking in Africa was 
critical of WIZZIT, concluding that WIZZIT failed to offer the payment and 
transaction services that its customers truly needed.162  The study reported that 
“[t]he mistake a lot of us make is to look at the folks at the base of the pyramid 
and assume they must need the same types of services we need.”163  On the other 
hand, any increase in financial inclusion is a good thing, and WIZZIT customers 
are making more banking transactions per month than non-users.164 
b.  M-PESA 
M-PESA is a mobile finance platform based in Kenya.165  “M-PESA” is short 
for “mobile money,” “pesa” being the Swahili word for money.166 
Unlike WIZZIT, which roots its business in the banking industry, M-PESA is 
fundamentally a telecommunications product.167   M-PESA was born of the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, which proposed 
a poverty-reducing project in partnership with Vodafone.168  Vodafone then 
                                                 
 157. See Lawack, supra note 141, at 320 n.7. 
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worked with its affiliate Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile phone service 
provider, with the blessing and support of the Central Bank of Kenya.169 
Accounts are easy to open at retail agent offices, which is also where deposits 
are made.170  The company holds the funds in trust for the customer, issuing “e-
float” or “e-money” to the customer’s account. 171   “E-money can then be 
transferred, used to pay for goods and services, or withdrawn[]”172 via a simple 
mobile phone interface.173  Withdrawals can be made at any ATM operated by 
Pesa Point, a company that partners with Safaricom to offer withdrawal 
services.174  Twenty-five partner banks and over 700 businesses now partner 
with Safaricom to facilitate bill payments via M-PESA. 175   More recently, 
customers are able to earn interest on some accounts.176  In order to increase M-
PESA’s user accessibility, “all customer communications are currently in both 
English and Swahili.”177 
Originally conceived as a microfinance platform, Vodafone and Safaricom 
wisely launched a six-month pilot program in October 2005.178  During the pilot, 
the two companies noted that users were finding ways to turn the microloan 
product into person-to-person transfers; for example, repaying others’ loans in 
exchange for goods and services or using the repayment and lending features as 
an “overnight safe.”179  This noticeable user behavior indicated that transactional 
services were far more necessary to the population than the microloans and, as 
such, M-PESA was reconfigured as a payment system before its national 
launch. 180   The same Harvard Business School case study that criticized 
WIZZIT’s overreach went on to applaud M-PESA’s ability to adapt to better 
meet its customers’ actual needs.181 
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“user-driven innovation”). 
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The M-PESA program has been a fantastic success.182  The full-scale launch 
of M-PESA occurred in March 2007, and was serving ten million customers by 
2010.183  By 2011, that figure reached fourteen million.184 
Users have embraced M-PESA because of its efficiency, security, and 
reliability. 185   Prior to M-PESA, funds transfers had to be conducted at 
commercial banks (largely unavailable to rural Kenyans), 186  post offices 
(“costly, slow, and prone to liquidity shortages at rural outlets”),187 or local 
courier services (which typically charge high fees and carry significant risk of 
loss or theft of funds).188  Now, users conduct two million M-PESA transactions 
every day, transferring nearly five billion dollars per year—17% of Kenya’s 
GDP—and conducting more transactions in Kenya than Western Union does 
globally.189 
Like WIZZIT, M-PESA’s social justice motivation has been obvious from its 
inception.190  The U.K.’s Department for International Development instigated 
the project and arranged for its initial financing because the Department 
recognized that “poverty alleviation programs generally require a significant 
initial investment, but often fail to generate financial returns commensurate with 
that investment.”191  Thus, in order to expand financial access to low-income 
individuals, the access must be inexpensive for providers to put in place. 
Interestingly, instead of resisting the competition, commercial banks in Kenya 
appear eager to partner with M-PESA.192  This may be because “the average 
mobile banking transaction [in Kenya] is about a hundred times smaller than the 
average check transaction . . . and just half the size of the average ATM 
transaction.”193  Thus, commercial banks do not feel threatened by the size and 
scope of the M-PESA market.194 
                                                 
 182. See generally Ignacio Mas & Amolo Ng’weno, Three Keys to M-PESA’s Success: 
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 185. See Buku & Meredith, supra note 168, at 399. 
 186. See id. at 38283. 
 187. See id. at 383; Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 165, at 174. 
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at 78. 
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Money Ecosystem 6 (Univ. of California-Irvine Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Research, Working Paper 
No. 2011-14, 2011). 
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Although “[d]eveloping markets instinctively use Kenya’s M-PESA as a 
guiding example to embark on mobile banking ventures,”195 the success of M-
PESA has been difficult to replicate in other countries.196  The system’s success 
in Kenya may be due to the confluence of some important demographic and 
economic characteristics unique to Kenya.  Specifically, Kenya’s population is 
largely young, 197  literate, and experienced with using mobile phone 
technology.198  In fact, over 80% of the population over the age of fifteen has 
access to a mobile phone.199  Furthermore, Safaricom, whose powerful branding 
is an important part of M-PESA’s success, handles 80% of all mobile phone 
business in Kenya.200  M-PESA, benefiting from limited (or nearly nonexistent) 
regulation by the Central Bank of Kenya, was also given the freedom to expand 
at the outset of the program. 201   Only later did government regulation and 
voluntarily imposed anti-money laundering standards arrive.202 
C.  Potential Roadblocks to Consumer Adoption 
Two important problems exist in the United States that may prevent mobile 
banking from reaching its potential among unbanked customers in America.  The 
first deals with usefulness, the second with security.203 
First, although Part II.B.2 discusses the utility of mobile banking in meeting 
the needs of the unbanked, it is possible mobile banking will not become useful 
enough to garner widespread adoption.  The Federal Reserve’s research 
indicates that “many consumers say their needs are already being met without 
mobile banking or payments, that they are comfortable with non-mobile options, 
and that they do not see a clear benefit from using either service.”204  When 
asked why they do not have a bank account, unbanked Americans commonly 
                                                 
 195. See Senthe, supra note 7, at 21. 
 196. See Buku & Meredith, supra note 168, at 379. 
 197. See id. at 384 (noting that 42% of Kenya’s thirty-nine million people are under the age of 
fourteen). 
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 201. See Buku & Meredith, supra note 168, at 386. 
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 203. See infra notes 204, 207 and accompanying text. 
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that the most popular responses from banked customers as to why they did not use mobile banking 
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say that they “do not have enough money to put in an account.”205  Having a 
bank account does not automatically increase the amount of money in a 
household; families living hand-to-mouth may have no need to store money in a 
bank because they need to spend it as soon as it is earned.206 
Second, security and privacy concerns may prevent consumers from adopting 
mobile banking. 207   Many unbanked people generally distrust the banking 
system,208 but even those who trust the system may distrust the security of their 
financial information on a mobile device.209 
III.  COMMERCIAL VIABILITY 
Traditionally, banks are reluctant to reach out to poor and unbanked people 
out of the concern that there are no profits to be made.210  These trends again 
raise the problem of dual financial services industries: one for the haves, the 
other for the have-nots.211  In recent years, however, non-bank financial service 
providers have been actively pursuing these customers.212 
These non-bank financial service providers currently pursuing unbanked 
customers may finally demonstrate to the banks that profits can be found among 
this customer base.  On the other hand, banks are more restricted by laws and 
regulations than non-banks, which may prevent them from taking advantage of 
features the non-banks are currently using to increase profit margins.213 
If banks will not market products to the poor because of insufficient profit 
margins, it is appropriate for the public sector to provide assistance.  Financial 
services are such an important part of a household’s economic wellbeing that 
support or subsidies from the public sector would be warranted.  There is 
precedent for this kind of intervention,214 and there are ways the public sector 
can develop and encourage adoption of mobile banking technology, as discussed 
below. 
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A.  Private Sector 
Non-banks are proving that serving low-income customers in volume can be 
economically feasible.  General-purpose reloadable prepaid cards, typically 
marketed to the unbanked and underbanked, have exploded in popularity.215  
They function in a similar manner to transaction accounts, in that funds can be 
deposited with the card issuer, and then withdrawn as cash or used for bill 
payment.216  They are a poor substitute, however, for a transaction account.217  
Prepaid cards are unregulated and largely uninsured.218  Moreover, bringing 
people into the existing regulated banking system is preferable to creating a 
work-around system, especially if a bifurcated system segregates the population 
by race and income level.219 
1.  Profit in Volume 
The prepaid card industry is impressively large and growing faster than any 
other type of payment.220  In 2012, there were over 159 million prepaid cards “in 
force” (meaning issued, activated, and not expired),221 used an average of ten 
times per month. 222   Most prepaid customers report using their cards for 
transaction services “to pay for every day purchases or bills” and “to receive 
payments.”223  Customers report that “put[ting] money in a safe place” is a 
significantly less popular purpose. 224   In fact, nearly 60% of unbanked 
households that use prepaid cards reload them, indicating consistent use and 
reliance on the card’s transaction features.225  However, only 4.2% of unbanked 
households obtained their prepaid cards at a bank branch.226  This evidence 
suggests that despite the obvious market for, and popularity of, prepaid cards, 
banks remain largely external to this corner of the economy.227 
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Prepaid card providers are filling the large need, which American banks are 
currently not meeting, for transaction services among the unbanked and 
underbanked.228  Banks, capitalizing on the volume of transactions to make 
serving the unbanked economically viable, can and should take part in this 
business.  Moreover, new customers should be encouraged to utilize electronic 
banking rather than other higher-cost service platforms, so the banks will not 
feel as burdened by the higher transaction volume.229  If existing customers can 
be shifted toward mobile banking as well, banks may even find savings that 
allow for different distribution of resources.230  If banking services are designed 
with these new customers in mind, banks may be able to solidify relationships 
with the new customers, expanding the possibility for the banks to provide 
additional or cross-sold products.231 
Start-up costs, on the other hand, have the potential to be prohibitively 
expensive for banks.  Not only must mobile banking platforms be built and 
maintained, but the banks’ processing systems and technologies may also need 
to be upgraded to increase speed and volume. 232   Outreach to unbanked 
populations will also be expensive.  Building new programs, increasing 
awareness and education, and outreach efforts have been demonstrably effective 
in bringing the unbanked into the banking system, but they bring significant 
price tags with them.233 
Yet several non-banks are already investing in new products and mobile 
delivery platforms targeting unbanked customers.234  One of these, Bluebird, is 
explored here as a case study. 
a.  Bluebird 
American Express offers some card services that function rather effectively 
as bank accounts.235  One of these card services is Bluebird, launched in 2012 as 
a joint project between American Express and Wal-Mart.236 
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Customers can sign up for Bluebird online or by buying a five-dollar starter 
kit at any Wal-Mart store.237  Once they have an account, customers can either 
add funds at a Wal-Mart cash register, by taking a picture of a check on a 
smartphone, or by arranging for direct deposit of paychecks or government 
benefits.238  Cash can be withdrawn at ATMs, and bills can be paid online or 
from the Bluebird app.239  Though some customers will incur minimal fees to 
withdraw funds at ATMs, there are no fees associated with monthly or annual 
maintenance, overdrafts, bill pay, inactivity, or card replacement. 240   The 
accounts offer check-writing abilities and “SetAside” savings pockets, and 
customer service is available 24/7 from American Express.241 
Funds on deposit with Bluebird are protected by FDIC “pass-through” 
insurance. 242   That is, when funds are deposited into a Bluebird account, 
American Express places the funds into custodial accounts maintained at FDIC-
insured banks.243  If one of the custodial banks fails, the funds will be insured; 
however, they will not necessarily be insured if American Express fails.244 
American Express and Wal-Mart are not acting with charitable intent.  Wal-
Mart has been attempting to enter the financial services industry for some 
time,245 and the Bluebird card has the benefit of bringing people physically into 
stores for setup, adding cash, and of course buying goods.246  Consumers also 
benefit from this “retail footprint that has so many more locations than any 
bank.”247  However, one limitation of these products is that they can only be 
used to purchase items at merchants who accept American Express.248 
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2.  Durbin Amendment 
Bluebird makes its money not from fees charged to customers (because there 
are hardly any), but by charging interchange fees to merchants.249  The Durbin 
Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act250 and its implementing regulations cap the 
fees that banks can charge merchants for debit transactions.251  Bank revenue 
fell by about eight billion dollars after these regulations were put in place.252 
These interchange-fee caps do not apply, however, to “prepaid cards,” and the 
Bluebird card is carefully designed so as to fit within the definition of a prepaid 
card, rather than a debit account.253  The result, however, is to put banks at a 
disadvantage by limiting the fees they can charge merchants rather than 
customers.254  Nevertheless, even with this restriction, banks may be able to 
price accounts and features so that they are commercially viable but also useful 
for low-income people.255 
B.  Public Sector 
If the private sector cannot absorb the start-up costs of increasing mobile 
banking access for the unbanked, it is appropriate for the public sector to provide 
support. 
In the past, the Treasury Department has provided funding for banks to 
provide services to the unbanked.  As part of the First Accounts program, the 
Treasury Department in 2002 awarded grants to selected institutions to defray 
outlay expenditures.256  Banks could also “receive a tax credit equal to a fixed 
amount per account opened.”257  This governmental support suggests that the 
banking industry may continue to need additional incentives to expand into 
unbanked populations; market forces and standard economic incentives may not 
be enough.258 
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The Treasury Department may also consider developing a mobile banking 
platform that banks could license.  A centralized platform would provide 
consistent services and features across all banks.  Further, developing one 
platform for all (or many) institutions to use would be more cost effective than 
each institution developing its own app.259 
Such public expenditures can be put toward building a mobile platform for 
older-model cell phones as well as an app for smartphones; such a platform and 
app, once created, can be utilized by multiple banks in interfacing with their 
customers.  This public investment would relieve individual banks from the time 
and expense of building their own platforms and apps, making it more feasible 
for banks to offer such programs.260  System maintenance and customer service 
would also be simplified if many banks used the same programs, thereby 
benefiting customers because the offered products would look similar from bank 
to bank.261  The platform and app should be available in a variety of languages, 
as well, to reach those individuals who utilize alternative financial service 
providers in part for their linguistic convenience.  Startup funds could (and 
should) also be used for outreach and marketing to potential customers. 
IV.  DESIGNING PRODUCTS FOR THE UNBANKED 
In order to meaningfully increase financial inclusion, the unbanked must be 
brought into the banking system and, more importantly, must stay there.262  The 
previous section suggested that private entities might find it more economically 
feasible to serve the unbanked, but that—even if that were not the case—the 
importance of financial inclusion is so significant that public funds can and 
should be expended to increase adoption of mobile banking technology.  This 
section proposes several features that would make bank accounts more appealing 
and valuable to unbanked people.  Many of these features are already recognized 
in the industry as being important to increasing financial inclusion.263 
A.  Account Features and Fees 
Accounts designed primarily for unbanked people should be transaction 
accounts rather than savings accounts.  While both types of accounts provide 
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safe storage of funds on deposit, transaction accounts provide valuable bill pay 
services, whereas savings accounts often restrict the number of transactions the 
customer can execute over a period of time.264  Given that the unbanked are 
unlikely to deposit significant amounts of money, the interest earned on savings 
accounts is not enough to offset the lost value of transaction services.265 
Recalling that unbanked and underbanked customers report feeling tricked by 
fees designed to punish mistakes, fees charged to customers utilizing these 
accounts should be up-front fees in set sums, rather than the customer incurring 
per-transaction or punitive fees after making an error.266  Set fees, therefore, are 
likely to keep would-be customers in bank accounts and curb newly-banked 
customers away from closing their accounts and leaving the banking system.267  
For the banks’ protection, overdrafts of these accounts should not be permitted. 
Basic transaction services, such as direct deposit and bill pay, should also be 
provided.268  These services ought to be maximized for use via a mobile phone.  
For example, customers should be able to initiate a bill payment to a new payee 
via the mobile app—a service that now must be largely initiated via online 
banking.269 
The customer should also be able to set up, manage, and disable alerts from 
the app (another service largely available only online), and these alerts should 
be sent promptly.270  The app should provide account balance and transaction 
history in real-time, or as close to real-time as possible.271  Remote deposit 
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capture (RDC) should also be enabled for mobile users, so that customers can 
take a picture of a check with the phone and deposit it via the mobile app.272 
Banks should also explore methods by which they can expand their ability to 
accept cash deposits.  WIZZIT, for instance, allows cash deposits to be made at 
any branch of a partner bank;273 U.S. banks should explore establishing similar 
partnerships so as to expand the geographic reach of their services.  The 
customer should have the ability to withdraw cash at ATMs with as low a 
transaction fee as is feasible for the bank. 
It may also be beneficial to offer financial education to newly-banked 
customers.  Many previous financial inclusion efforts have included significant 
educational components, including the First Accounts Program,274 Bank on San 
Francisco,275 and the Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program.276  Mobile platforms, 
especially apps, are excellent opportunities for financial education.277  A bank 
account app could include pop-up “did you know?” information, or offer real-
time chat with customer service agents.  A mobile game could even be developed 
to help users familiarize themselves with basic financial tools and information. 
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for SDLs and NSDLs . . . are in line with the industry average”), commentators roundly denounced 
it.  See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 34, at 17475 (writing that “[a]t best, banks can be incentivized 
to meet the poor’s banking needs,” but “[f]orcing banks, whose purpose is to maximize profits, to 
make loans to the poor will inevitably lead to inadequate loans and disgruntled bankers”); William 
M. Webster IV, Payday Loan Prohibitions: Protecting Financially Challenged Consumers or 
Pushing Them over the Edge?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051, 106667 (2012) (writing, wryly, 
that “[i]t should be noted that this small-dollar loan template is called ‘feasible’ rather than 
‘profitable’”); Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title Pledge 
Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 42829 (2010).  For another example of financial 
education, see generally The America Saves Program, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., www.america 
saves.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
 277. See FDIC, supra note 8, at 1112. 
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B.  Opening the Account 
The FDIC has suggested, but not analyzed, that opening mobile accounts 
could increase financial inclusion among the unbanked.278  Increasing the utility 
of an account increases the likelihood of widespread adoption, and convenient 
account opening would both increase the utility of the account and reduce 
barriers to opening an account. 
A few banks already offer mobile account opening, but expanding this 
capability could be a major step forward in increasing financial inclusion among 
the unbanked.279  However, the idea of a customer opening an account without 
presenting herself at a bank poses several problems.280  Most obviously, mobile 
account opening poses customer identification problems, which in turn leads to 
concerns about money laundering and other account misuse.281 
Banks are required to develop customer identification plans, known in the 
industry as know-your-customer (KYC) or customer due diligence (CDD) 
requirements.282  Financial institutions are required to conduct basic identity 
checks on customers opening new accounts. 283   Typically, U.S. customers 
opening accounts are required to show identification such as a driver’s license 
before an account can be opened.284  These basic, initial identity checks serve to 
reduce money laundering and other misuse of accounts by ensuring that accounts 
are not opened by known criminals or under fictitious names.285 
Such KYC requirements may, however, also serve as the first barrier to entry 
for the unbanked.286  Flexibility, nevertheless, is possible: the KYC regulations 
require only “risk-based procedures for verifying the identity of each customer 
to the extent reasonable and practicable[,]” specifically, the customer’s name, 
                                                 
 278. See id. at 63. 
 279. See FDIC, supra note 11, at 17. 
 280. See id. at 1819 (listing problems, which include compliance with Bank Secrecy Act 
requirements, providing assurance to those who are uncomfortable inputting their information into 
a potentially insecure device, and developing user-friendly interfaces for reaching those customers 
who are not tech savvy). 
 281. See Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-A-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency 
Exchanges Won’t Stop Online Money Laundering, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 30 (2014). 
 282. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(1) (2012); see also Michael Volkov, Know Your Customer 
(“KYC”) Due Diligence Best Practices, TRULIOO (Jul. 30, 2015), https://www.trulioo.com/blog/ 
2015/07/30/know-your-customer-kyc-due-diligence-best-practices. 
 283. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2). 
 284. See Answers About Identification, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.helpwith 
mybank.gov/get-answers/bank-accounts/identification/faq-bank-accounts-identification-02.html 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 285. Banks’ recordkeeping and reporting of suspicious transactions are other important 
sentinels in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.  See Christopher, supra note 
281, at 68. 
 286. See FDIC, supra note 11, at 2829.  Tension regarding how stringent financial regulation 
should be has long existed.  Regulations should “be tight enough to protect users and discourage 
money laundering, but open enough to allow new services to emerge.”  Senthe, supra note 7, at 25 
(internal citation omitted). 
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date of birth, address, and an identification number.287  Thus, KYC requirements 
can be satisfied by means other than a driver’s license.  More identification 
options will likely increase the number of customers who can open bank 
accounts.  The Bank on San Francisco project, for instance, required banks to 
accept Mexican and Guatemalan consular IDs as the new customers’ primary 
ID,288  and under the program as a whole, 11,000 new bank accounts were 
opened.289 
The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental policy-making 
organization, recommends that countries adopt a risk-based approach in 
designing KYC requirements.290  A risk-based approach means that customers 
and accounts that pose high risk of criminal activity should be subjected to 
higher scrutiny by the financial institution;291 the flip side of this is that accounts 
and customers who pose low risk may be less closely scrutinized.292 
Importantly, FATF suggests that low-balance accounts can be opened with 
minimal KYC regulations. 293   Because currently unbanked individuals in 
America are disproportionately poor, the accounts they would open would be 
primarily low-balance.  These potential banking customers, then, could be 
permitted to open certain accounts with minimal identification procedures.  The 
accounts could have a maximum balance cap to prevent abuse—a sum large 
enough to be useful for daily living but not high enough to tempt money 
launderers.294  Perhaps a cap at $2,500 or $5,000 would ensure the accounts 
remained at this lower risk threshold, as would a limit on the number or size of 
transactions that can be made. 
Customers may be able to identify themselves to banks by taking and 
submitting photos of driver’s licenses or other government IDs taken on the cell 
phone’s camera.295  Cell phones also provide unique features that can help banks 
identify users, such as the ability to determine a phone’s location—tracking the 
phone’s location may assist in curtailing suspicious activity.296  Identification 
requirements could also be relaxed if the account owners arranged to have 
paychecks or government benefit payments directly deposited into the account. 
                                                 
 287. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2).  For “a U.S. person,” that means a taxpayer identification 
number, and for “a non-U.S. person,” a taxpayer identification number, passport number, alien 
identification card number, or other government-issued identity card.  Id. 
 288. See Choe, supra note 1, at 38586. 
 289. See id. at 387. 
 290. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APPROACH: PREPAID 
CARDS, MOBILE PAYMENTS, AND INTERNET-BASED PAYMENT SERVICES 2627 (2013). 
 291. See id. at 27. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See id. at 2829. 
 294. See, e.g., Get a Bluebird Account, supra note 50 (describing the limits Bluebird places on 
the amount of funds that can be added to an account and spent). 
 295. FDIC, supra note 11, at 1819. 
 296. See id. at 19. 
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KYC concerns are not the only barrier preventing wider availability of mobile 
account opening.  As mentioned above, slow processing systems within the 
bank’s infrastructure may also pose difficulties “optimizing the mobile browsing 
experience for account opening.” 297   Mobile phone screens may also be 
insufficient to display the various account-opening disclosures required.298 
C.  Security Concerns 
Many people, banked and unbanked, avoid mobile banking out of security 
concerns.299  However, 
industry reports argue that mobile applications have the potential to be 
more secure than online applications for at least three reasons.  First, 
some vendors are developing features that can use a mobile device’s 
camera to scan photographs of documents and automatically insert 
needed information into the application.  The photograph also helps 
banks assess the authenticity of the documents used.  Second, by using 
the location-tracking capabilities of mobile devices, banks can identify 
an applicant’s actual location, which helps prevent fraud.  Third, banks 
can use biometric authentication—including facial, voice, and 
fingerprint recognition—to enhance security.300 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Simply opening a bank account will not solve a poor person’s economic 
problems.301  However, increasing financial inclusion throughout the United 
States is necessary for the economic stability of all Americans. 302   Mobile 
phones can be a new and important entry point for bringing the unbanked into 
the regulated financial system.  Such mobile access may be economically 
feasible for the banks, but if not, the social value is such that mobile access 
should be subsidized and incentivized by the government. 303   Statutes and 
regulations should be revised to increase financial inclusion via mobile banking.  
In particular, KYC requirements should be reduced for small accounts, and 
deposited funds from trusted sources should be made immediately available to 
account holders. 
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 299. See id. at 29, 36 (noting that “security risks of this emerging delivery channel are less 
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 300. Id. at 2930 (footnotes omitted). 
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 302. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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